Supreme Court in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs. Sanjay Dalia held that the provisions of
section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have to
be interpreted in the purposive manner and clarified that if the plaintiff is
residing or carrying on business etc. at a place where cause of action, wholly
or in part, has also arisen, he has to file a suit at that place.
The
Court observed that under Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of
the Trade Marks Act, an additional forum has been provided by including a
District Court within whose limits the plaintiff actually and voluntarily
resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. The object of the
provisions was to enable the plaintiff to institute a suit at a place where he or
they resided or carried on business, not to enable them to drag defendant
further away from such a place also as is being done in the instant cases.
The
Court held that the expression “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Civil Procedure” does not oust the applicability of the provisions of
section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it is clear that additional
remedy has been provided to the plaintiff so as to file a suit where he is
residing or carrying on business etc., as the case may be. Section 20 of the
Code of Civil Procedure enables a plaintiff to file a suit where the defendant
resides or where cause of action arose. Section 20(a) and section 20(b) usually
provides the venue where the defendant or any of them resides, carries on
business or personally works for gain. Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil
Procedure enables a plaintiff to institute a suit where the cause of action
wholly or in part, arises. The Explanation to Section 20 C.P.C. has been added
to the effect that Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole
or principal office in India or in respect of any cause of action arising at
any place where it has subordinate office at such place. Thus, ‘corporation’
can be sued at a place having its sole or principal office and where cause of action
wholly or in part, arises at a place where it has also a subordinate office at
such place.
On a due and
anxious consideration of the provisions contained in section 20 of the CPC,
section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, and the
object with which the latter provisions have been enacted, it is clear that if
a cause of action has arisen wholly or in part, where the plaintiff is residing
or having its principal office/carries on business or personally works for
gain, the suit can be filed at such place/s. Plaintiff(s) can also institute a
suit at a place where he is residing, carrying on business or personally works
for gain de hors the fact that the cause of action has not arisen at a
place where he/they are residing or any one of them is residing, carries on
business or personally works for gain. However, this right to institute suit at
such a place has to be read subject to certain restrictions, such as in case
plaintiff is residing or carrying on business at a particular place/having its
head office and at such place cause of action has also arisen wholly or in
part, plaintiff cannot ignore such a place under the guise that he is carrying
on business at other far flung places also. The very intendment of the
insertion of provision in the Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act is the
convenience of the plaintiff. The rule of convenience of the parties has been
given a statutory expression in section 20 of the CPC as well. The
interpretation of provisions has to be such which prevents the mischief of
causing inconvenience to parties.
The intendment of
the aforesaid provisions inserted in the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act
is to provide a forum to the plaintiff where he is residing, carrying on business
or personally works for gain. The object is to ensure that the plaintiff is not
deterred from instituting infringement proceedings “because the court in which proceedings
are to be instituted is at a considerable distance from the place of their
ordinary residence”. The impediment created to the plaintiff by section 20
C.P.C. of going to a place where it was not having ordinary residence or
principal place of business was sought to be removed by virtue of the aforesaid
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act. Where the Corporation
is having ordinary residence/principal place of business and cause of action
has also arisen at that place, it has to institute a suit at the said place and
not at other places. The provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section
134 of the Trade Marks Act never intended to operate in the field where the
plaintiff is having its principal place of business at a particular place and
the cause of action has also arisen at that place so as to enable it to file a
suit at a distant place where its subordinate office is situated though at such
place no cause of action has arisen. Such interpretation would cause great harm
and would be juxtaposed to the very legislative intendment of the provisions so
enacted.
In our opinion, in
a case where cause of action has arisen at a place where the plaintiff is
residing or where there are more than one such persons, any of them actually or
voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain would
oust the jurisdiction of other place where the cause of action has not arisen
though at such a place, by virtue of having subordinate office, the plaintiff
instituting a suit or other proceedings might be carrying on business or
personally works for gain.
At the same time,
the provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade
Marks Act have removed the embargo of suing at place of accrual of cause of
action wholly or in part, with regard to a place where the plaintiff or any of
them ordinarily resides, carries on business or personally works for gain. We
agree to the aforesaid extent the impediment imposed under section 20 of the
CPC to a plaintiff to institute a suit in a court where the defendant resides
or carries on business or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises,
has been removed. But the right is subject to the rider in case plaintiff
resides or has its principal place of business/carries on business or personally
works for gain at a place where cause of action has also arisen, suit should be
filed at that place not at other places where plaintiff is having branch
offices etc.
There is no doubt
about it that the words used in section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134
of the Trade Marks Act, ‘notwithstanding anything contained in CPC or any other
law for the time being in force’, emphasise that the requirement of section 20
of the CPC would not have to be complied with by the plaintiff if he resides or
carries on business in the local limits of the court where he has filed the
suit but, in our view, at the same
time, as the provision providing for an additional forum, cannot be interpreted
in the manner that it has authorised the plaintiff to institute a suit at a
different place other than the place where he is ordinarily residing or having
principal office and incidentally where the cause of action wholly or in part
has also arisen. The impugned judgments, in our considered view, do not
take away the additional forum and fundamental basis of conferring the right
and advantage to the authors of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act
provided under the aforesaid provisions.
The Supreme Court
further refuting the submission of the Appellant observed that it is settled
proposition of law that the interpretation of the provisions has to be such
which prevents mischief. The said principle was explained in Heydon’s
case [76 ER 637]. According to the mischief rule, four points are required to
be taken into consideration. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief
that the statute was designed to remedy should first be identified and then a
construction that suppresses the problem and advances the remedy should be
adopted.
The rule was explained in the Bengal
Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar [AIR 1955 SC 661] by S.R. DAS, CJI as
follows: “It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in
England as far back as 1584 when Heydon’s case (supra) was decided that
for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal
or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to
be discerned and considered:
1st - What was the
common law before the making of the Act?
2nd - What was the
mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
3rd
- What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of
the commonwealth, and
4th
- The true reason of the remedy;
Considering the
first aspect of aforesaid principle, the common law which was existing before the
provisions of law were passed was section 20 of the CPC. It did not provide for
the plaintiff to institute a suit except in accordance with the provisions
contained in section 20. The defect in existing law was
inconvenience/deterrence caused to the authors suffering from financial
constraints on account of having to vindicate their intellectual property
rights at a place far away from their residence or the place of their business.
The said mischief or defect in the existing law which did not provide for the plaintiff
to sue at a place where he ordinarily resides or carries on business or
personally works for gain, was sought to be removed. Hence, the remedy was
provided incorporating the provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act. The
provisions enabled the plaintiff or any of them to file a suit at the aforesaid
places. But if they were residing or carrying on business or personally worked
for gain already at such place, where cause of action has arisen, wholly or in
part, the said provisions have not provided additional remedy to them to file a
suit at a different place. The said provisions never intended to operate in
that field. The operation of the provisions was limited and their objective was
clearly to enable the plaintiff to file a suit at the place where he is
ordinarily residing or carrying on business etc., as enumerated above, not to
go away from such places. The Legislature has never intended that the plaintiff
should not institute the suit where he ordinarily resides or at its Head Office
or registered office or where he otherwise carries on business or personally
works for gain where the cause of action too has arisen and should drag the
defendant to a subordinate office or other place of business which is at a far
distant place under the guise of the fact that the plaintiff/corporation is carrying
on business through branch or otherwise at such other place also. If such an
interpretation is permitted, as rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents,
the abuse of the provision will take place. Corporations and big conglomerates
etc. might be having several subordinate offices throughout the country.
Interpretation otherwise would permit them to institute infringement
proceedings at a far flung place and at unconnected place as compared to a
place where plaintiff is carrying on their business, and at such place, cause
of action too has arisen. In the instant cases, the principal place of business
is, admittedly, in Mumbai and the cause of action has also arisen in Mumbai.
Thus, the provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the
Trade Marks Act cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to confer jurisdiction
on the Delhi court in the aforesaid circumstances to entertain such suits. The
Delhi court would have no territorial jurisdiction to entertain it.
The avoidance of
counter mischief to the defendant is also necessary while giving the remedy to
the plaintiff under the provisions in question. It was never visualised by the
law makers that both the parties would be made to travel to a distant place in
spite of the fact that the plaintiff has a remedy of suing at the place where
the cause of action has arisen where he is having head office/carrying on
business etc. The provisions of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act provide
for the authors/trade marks holders to sue at their ordinary residence or where
they carry on their business. The said provisions of law never intended to be
oppressive to the defendant. The Parliamentary Debate quoted above has to be
understood in the manner that suit can be filed where the plaintiff ordinarily
resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Discussion was to provide
remedy to plaintiff at convenient place; he is not to travel away. Debate was
not to enable plaintiff to take defendant to farther place, leaving behind his
place of residence/business etc. The right to remedy given is not unbriddled
and is subject to the prevention of abuse of the aforesaid provisions, as
discussed above. Parliament never intended that the subject provisions to be
abused by the plaintiff by instituting suit in wholly unconnected jurisdiction.
In the instant cases, as the principal place of business is at Mumbai the cause
of action is also at Mumbai but still the place for suing has been chosen at
Delhi. There may be a case where plaintiff is carrying on the business at
Mumbai and cause of action has arisen in Mumbai. Plaintiff is having branch
offices at Kanyakumari and also at Port Blair, if interpretation suggested by
appellants is acceptable, mischief may be caused by such plaintiff to drag a
defendant to Port Blair or Kanyakumari. The provisions cannot be interpreted in
the said manner devoid of the object of the Act.
The Court further
refuted the argument that Heydon’s rule is not applicable where the
words of the statute are clear. Reliance has been placed on M/s. Hiralal
Rattanlal etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and Anr. etc. [1973 (1) SCC 216] in
which it has been observed that when the provision is unambiguous and if from
the provision legislative intent is clear, the court need not call into aid the
other rule of construction of statutes such as that of ‘mischief’. The Court
opined that when two interpretations are possible, the court has to adopt the
one which furthers the object as provided in the statute itself.
Court opined that the
provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade
Marks Act have to be interpreted in the purposive manner. No doubt about it
that a suit can be filed by the plaintiff at a place where he is residing or
carrying on business or personally works for gain. He need not travel to file a
suit to a place where defendant is residing or cause of action wholly or in
part arises. However, if the plaintiff is residing or carrying on business etc.
at a place where cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he has to
file a suit at that place, as discussed above.
