Trap Purchases and
Manufactured Jurisdiction in Indian IP Litigation
A study of SML Ltd. v. M/s
Happy Agro Chemicals and the doctrine of trap transactions
Introduction
In intellectual property
disputes, few procedural issues matter as much as deciding where a case
can be filed. The choice of court often shapes the entire journey of the case —
from how quickly interim orders are granted, to the attitude of the local
lawyers, to the practical burden placed on a defendant who must fight far from
home.
Because the forum is so
important, plaintiffs sometimes try to influence it. The most common method is
the trap purchase: a test buy arranged by the plaintiff, where an
investigator pretends to be a regular customer, purchases the allegedly
infringing product, and keeps the invoice and packaging. Later, this evidence
is used not only to show infringement but — more controversially — to argue
that the cause of action arose within the territory of the chosen court.
Trap purchases are not new, nor
are they automatically improper. In cases of counterfeiting or passing‑off,
they are often the only way a rights‑holder can move from mere hearsay to hard
proof that the defendant is actually selling infringing goods.
The problem arises when a trap
purchase is asked to do double duty: not just to prove infringement, but
also to create the jurisdictional link that allows the plaintiff to sue in a
court of their choice.
The Himachal Pradesh High Court’s
recent decision in SML Ltd. v. M/s Happy Agro Chemicals (2026) is one of
the clearest Indian rulings on this issue. Building on the Delhi High Court’s
reasoning in Indovax Pvt. Ltd. v. Merck Animal Health, the Court held
that a one‑off trap purchase from an unauthorised dealer cannot, by itself,
establish territorial jurisdiction. Instead, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant is selling the infringing goods within the forum on a commercial
scale.
This article explores how Indian
law currently treats trap purchases, places the doctrine within the framework
of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, compares it with how test
purchases and manufactured jurisdiction are handled in the UK, US, and EU, and
closes with the policy balance the doctrine seeks to maintain: the rights‑holder’s
need to enforce their rights versus the defendant’s right not to be dragged
into a distant or artificially chosen court.
Case Law Analysis
SML Ltd. v. M/s Happy Agro
Chemicals: three invoices in Shimla
The facts in SML Ltd. v. M/s
Happy Agro Chemicals read almost like a textbook example of manufactured
jurisdiction. SML Ltd., an agrochemical company with a patent titled “Agricultural
Composition” (valid until 2037 and marketed as “TECHNOZ”), sued three
defendants over a competing fertiliser sold under the mark “SELZIC.”
The defendants were spread across
India:
- A single retail shop in Rohru Tehsil, Shimla
(Himachal Pradesh).
- Mitul Industries, a manufacturer based in Mumbai.
- ULink, a wholesaler based in Pune.
Mitul and ULink had an agreement
to manufacture and market SELZIC, but neither operated in Himachal Pradesh.
SML chose Himachal Pradesh as the
forum, relying almost entirely on three invoices from trap purchases arranged
at the Shimla shop. The manufacturer and wholesaler resisted jurisdiction on
three key grounds:
- Neither resided in Himachal Pradesh.
- SELZIC was regulated under the Fertilizer (Control)
Order, 1985, and their authorisations covered Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh — not Himachal Pradesh.
- They had never sold SELZIC to the Shimla shop or to
any dealer in the State.
The Court’s reasoning unfolded on
two levels:
Procedural: Section 20 CPC
allows a plaintiff to sue in a forum where one defendant resides, but only with
leave of the court or if the other defendants consent. SML had neither. It
therefore had to justify jurisdiction based solely on cause of action. Relying
on Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad (2024), the Court confirmed that
jurisdiction can be tested even at the interim‑relief stage.
Doctrinal: Could isolated
trap purchases establish jurisdiction? The Court accepted that trap purchases
are legitimate evidence and can help maintain a suit. But it drew a sharp line:
proving infringement is different from creating jurisdiction. To anchor
jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s sales occur in the
forum at a commercial scale — a principle drawn from Indovax. Three
orchestrated purchases from an unauthorised retailer, disconnected from the
manufacturer or wholesaler, did not meet that standard.
The Court clarified what counts
as a “commercial sale.” Drawing on Smithkline French Laboratories Ltd. v.
Indoco Remedies Ltd., it held that jurisdiction usually arises from sales
through the defendant’s own authorised distributor or dealer — not from
isolated purchases at a shop the defendant never supplied.
SML’s fallback argument based on
online listings also failed. The Court held that merely listing a product on a
website or marketplace like IndiaMart does not amount to a commercial
transaction in the forum. Otherwise, plaintiffs could conjure jurisdiction
anywhere by pointing to an accessible website. Delivery options on ULink’s
listing, tellingly, showed only Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. This reasoning
echoed Helsinn Healthcare SA v. AET Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., where the
Delhi High Court held that website accessibility alone does not equal targeting
consumers in a territory absent an actual transaction.
Indovax Pvt. Ltd. v. Merck
Animal Health: the evidentiary floor
The SML ruling is best
understood as an application of the Delhi High Court’s 2017 decision in Indovax
Pvt. Ltd. v. Merck Animal Health. In Indovax, the plaintiff sued over the marks
INDOVAX and INNOVAX (animal vaccines), claiming Delhi jurisdiction on the basis
that the defendant’s goods were “available in Delhi.” The Court rejected this,
holding that goods procured elsewhere and later sold in Delhi could not be
equated with the defendant itself selling in Delhi. Importantly, the Court
stressed that bare claims of availability, without documentary proof such as
invoices linking sales to the defendant, are not enough to invoke jurisdiction.
Indovax thus set the evidentiary baseline that SML enforces: a single invoice —
or even a few — must meet a demanding standard before they can carry
jurisdictional weight.
Banyan Tree Holding v. A.
Murali Krishna Reddy: fairness and purposeful availment
The deeper conceptual foundation
lies in the Delhi High Court’s Division Bench ruling in Banyan Tree Holding
v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy (2009). In Banyan Tree,
neither party was based in Delhi. The plaintiff tried to anchor jurisdiction on
the defendant’s website and a single trap transaction — the ordering of a
brochure in Delhi. The Division Bench held that when the plaintiff is not
carrying on business in the forum, jurisdiction requires proof that the
defendant purposefully targeted the forum by entering into a genuine commercial
transaction with a consumer there, and that this caused harm to the plaintiff.
Trap transactions may be used as evidence, but they cannot themselves create
jurisdiction if the defendant has not otherwise targeted the forum. And if trap
transactions are the only evidence, they must be obtained fairly and in good
faith. Fairness and bona fides are not incidental; they are conditions of
admissibility.
In reaching this conclusion, the
Court drew on both UK and US authority: the 1897 UK case California Fig
Syrup Co. v. Taylor’s Drug Company Ltd., which emphasised fairness in
accepting trap‑order evidence, and the American doctrines of “effects” and
“purposeful availment.” Banyan Tree thus forms the bridge between Indian
law and comparative jurisprudence, explaining why the language of “purposeful
availment” now recurs in cases like SML.
Taken together, a coherent Indian
line of authority emerges:
- The Supreme Court in Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi
(2006) held that mere advertisements do not establish commercial sales in
a forum.
- A.B.C. Laminart v. A.P. Agencies (1989)
supplies the orthodox framework for identifying where a cause of action
arises under Section 20(c) CPC.
- The Delhi High Court in Kohinoor Seed Fields v.
Veda Seed Sciences (2026) accepted jurisdiction where infringing goods
were genuinely available through e‑commerce platforms operating into the
forum — the mirror image of SML, showing that online availability
matters when it is active, not passive.
- In Safex Chemicals v. SML Ltd. (2026), the
Himachal Pradesh High Court set aside an ex parte injunction because no
authentic transaction within the forum was shown.
Quick Case Brief Table:
|
Case |
Year |
Issue |
Court’s Holding |
Key Principle |
|
SML Ltd. v. Happy Agro |
2026 |
Trap purchases &
jurisdiction |
Trap purchases valid for
evidence, not for jurisdiction |
Requires commercial‑scale,
defendant‑driven sales |
|
Indovax v. Merck |
2017 |
Availability claims |
Bare claims of availability
insufficient |
Documentary proof (invoices)
required |
|
Banyan Tree |
2009 |
Internet jurisdiction |
Trap transactions cannot alone
create jurisdiction |
Purposeful availment + fairness |
The doctrine, in short, is not
hostile to trap purchases. It is hostile to isolated trap purchases being asked
to do jurisdictional work they cannot bear.
Comparative Perspectives
Indian courts did not develop the
trap‑purchase doctrine in isolation. The reasoning in Banyan Tree and
later cases draws consciously from three foreign traditions, each grappling
with the same problem: how to stop plaintiffs from artificially creating a
forum’s connection to a defendant.
United Kingdom: Fairness of
the Trap Order
English law has examined “trap
orders” for more than a century. The classic case, California Fig Syrup Co.
v. Taylor’s Drug Company Ltd. (1897), held that while trap orders are
admissible in passing‑off and trade mark disputes, courts must test them for
fairness. A trap carried out deceptively, or designed to lure a trader into
conduct they would not otherwise engage in, carries little weight. Modern
English practice continues this approach: trap purchases are legitimate, but
claimants are expected to conduct them fairly and give defendants prompt notice
so they can investigate while facts are fresh. The concern is the same as in
India — evidence created by the plaintiff’s own contrivance must be reliable
and in good faith.
United States: Minimum
Contacts and Manufactured Jurisdiction
American law tackles the issue
through the constitutional doctrine of personal jurisdiction. Since International
Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), a defendant can be sued in a forum only if
it has “minimum contacts” there, consistent with fair play and substantial
justice. Two refinements matter for trap purchases:
- The Calder v. Jones (1984) “effects test”
asks whether the defendant aimed its conduct at the forum and caused harm
there.
- Walden v. Fiore (2014) makes clear that
jurisdictional contacts must arise from the defendant’s own conduct — the
plaintiff cannot be the sole link.
In other words, a contact that
exists only because the plaintiff engineered it is no contact at all. For
internet disputes, the Zippo “sliding scale” distinguishes interactive
commercial websites (which may support jurisdiction) from passive, merely
accessible ones (which generally do not) — a distinction that mirrors SML’s
treatment of ULink and IndiaMart listings.
European Union: Accessibility
vs. Directed Activity
The EU resolves cross‑border
jurisdiction through the Brussels I Recast Regulation. Article 7(2) allows suit
where the harmful event occurred or may occur. The Court of Justice has
consistently held that mere accessibility of a website in a Member State is not
enough; the trader must direct activity to that State. In Pammer and Hotel
Alpenhof (2010), the Court listed factors showing “directed activity.” In L’Oréal
v. eBay (2011), it held that offers must target consumers in the territory
to trigger EU trade mark rights. And in Wintersteiger (2012), it
clarified where online trade mark harm occurs. The consistent lesson:
accessibility is not targeting — the same principle applied by the Himachal
Pradesh High Court when it refused to treat a nationwide IndiaMart listing as a
Shimla transaction.
Brief comparative table for
clarity:
|
Jurisdiction |
Key Case(s) |
Principle |
Relevance to India |
|
UK |
California Fig Syrup
(1897) |
Trap orders admissible but must
be fair |
Mirrors Indian emphasis on bona
fides |
|
US |
International Shoe
(1945), Calder (1984), Walden (2014), Zippo (1997) |
Jurisdiction requires
defendant’s own contacts; plaintiff cannot manufacture them |
Aligns with SML
rejection of plaintiff‑engineered jurisdiction |
|
EU |
Pammer (2010), L’Oréal
v. eBay (2011), Wintersteiger (2012) |
Accessibility ≠ targeting; must
direct activity to forum |
Echoed in SML’s
treatment of IndiaMart listings |
Common Thread Across all
three systems, the message is clear: courts will not let plaintiffs substitute
contrived evidence or the passive reach of the internet for genuine, defendant‑driven
commercial engagement with the forum.
Statutory Framework
The trap‑purchase doctrine is
ultimately about how courts interpret statutory rules on jurisdiction. Here are
the key anchors:
Section 20, Code of Civil
Procedure (CPC)
- Clause (a): A suit may be filed where the defendant
resides, carries on business, or works for gain.
- Clause (b): If there are multiple defendants, suit
may be filed where one resides or carries on business — but only if the
court grants leave or the other defendants consent.
- Clause (c): A suit may be filed where the cause of
action, wholly or in part, arises.
Trap purchases almost always aim
to satisfy clause (c): the plaintiff argues that the offending sale
within the forum is part of the cause of action.
- In SML, both traps were attempted:
- Clause (b) trap: SML sued Mumbai and Pune
defendants in Shimla without leave or consent.
- Clause (c) trap: Three orchestrated
purchases were argued to be part of the cause of action in Himachal
Pradesh. The Court rejected this, holding that only commercial‑scale
sales count.
The Explanation to Section 20
further limits forum shopping by deeming corporations to carry on business only
at their principal office, or at a subordinate office where the cause of action
arises.
Trade Marks Act, 1999
- Section 134(2): Gives plaintiffs an advantage in
trade mark and passing‑off suits. A registered proprietor can sue where it
carries on business, even if the defendant does not.
- This is why trap purchases matter most in patent
cases and trade mark cases where the plaintiff has no presence in the
chosen forum — because Section 134(2) cannot be used, leaving only Section
20 CPC.
Patents Act, 1970
- Section 104: Patent infringement suits must
be filed in a District Court (or High Court if revocation is counter‑claimed)
with jurisdiction under CPC rules.
- No plaintiff‑friendly shortcut exists here. A
patentee must prove jurisdiction strictly under Section 20 CPC.
- In SML, this meant the case turned entirely
on whether commercial‑scale sales in Himachal Pradesh could be shown.
Sectoral Overlay: Fertilizer
(Control) Order, 1985
- SELZIC could only be marketed in authorised States.
- The manufacturer’s and wholesaler’s licences
excluded Himachal Pradesh.
- This regulatory fact reinforced that the trap
purchases were disconnected from the defendants’ genuine trade.
Statutory Quick Reference
Table:
|
Statute |
Section |
Rule |
Effect on Trap Purchases |
Example Case |
|
CPC, 1908 |
Sec. 20(a)–(c) |
Jurisdiction based on
residence, business, or cause of action |
Trap purchases usually invoked
under 20(c) |
SML |
|
Trade Marks Act, 1999 |
Sec. 134(2) |
Plaintiff can sue where it
carries on business |
Reduces reliance on trap
purchases |
Trademark suits |
|
Patents Act, 1970 |
Sec. 104 |
Jurisdiction only under CPC |
No shortcut; trap purchases
carry full weight |
SML |
|
Fertilizer (Control) Order,
1985 |
Licensing rules |
Restricts authorised
territories |
Reinforces absence of genuine
trade |
SML |
The Interaction in Practice
- Section 20(c) makes the place where the cause of
action arises decisive.
- Trap purchases are the plaintiff’s attempt to plant
that cause of action in a chosen forum.
- The Indovax–Banyan Tree–SML line of cases
polices this attempt by insisting that the transaction reflect genuine,
commercial‑scale, defendant‑driven trade — not plaintiff‑engineered
evidence.
Policy Considerations
The trap‑purchase doctrine sits
at the crossroads of two legitimate but competing interests. Its coherence
depends on keeping them in balance.
The Enforcement Interest
Rights‑holders often have an
urgent need to gather evidence of infringement, and trap purchases are
frequently the only way to do so. Counterfeiters and infringers rarely
advertise their conduct; without the ability to arrange a documented test
purchase, a plaintiff may be left with nothing more than rumour or suspicion.
Indian courts have never doubted this. Both Banyan Tree and SML
affirm that trap transactions are legitimate evidence and that even a single
trap order can help maintain a suit. To disable trap purchases entirely would
make enforcement prohibitively costly, especially for smaller rights‑holders
facing well‑resourced infringers.
The Anti‑Forum‑Shopping
Interest
On the other side lies the
defendant’s interest — and the system’s interest — in preventing manufactured
jurisdiction. If a plaintiff could create a cause of action anywhere simply by
sending an agent to make a purchase, or by pointing to an accessible website,
they would enjoy an unconstrained choice of forum. That choice imposes real
burdens: a Mumbai manufacturer or Pune wholesaler dragged to Shimla must
litigate far from its records, witnesses, and counsel, often under the shadow
of an ex parte injunction. Forum shopping also undermines predictability and
encourages strategic pursuit of “plaintiff‑friendly” benches. The doctrine’s
answer is the requirement of commercial‑scale, defendant‑driven sales: trap
purchases can prove infringement, but they cannot alone create jurisdiction
unless they reflect genuine trade by the defendant.
Evidentiary Reliability and
Fairness
A third strand concerns the
integrity of the evidence itself. Because trap purchases are arranged by the
plaintiff, they carry an inherent risk of contrivance — the transaction may be
structured to look more commercial than it is, or the “customer” may induce
conduct the defendant would not otherwise undertake. Courts therefore require
traps to be conducted fairly and weigh the bona fides of the transaction. This
is not hostility to enforcement; it is ordinary evidential prudence applied to
a category of proof generated by an interested party.
Policy Matrix for quick
reference:
|
Interest |
Risk if Ignored |
Safeguard |
Case Example |
|
Enforcement |
Rights‑holders left with only
hearsay |
Trap purchases admissible as
evidence |
Banyan Tree, SML |
|
Anti‑Forum‑Shopping |
Defendants dragged into distant
courts |
Require commercial‑scale,
defendant‑driven sales |
Indovax, SML |
|
Evidentiary Fairness |
Contrived transactions distort
record |
Traps must be fair & bona
fide |
California Fig Syrup, Banyan
Tree |
The Balance Struck
The synthesis reached in SML
is proportionate. It neither romanticises the rights‑holder’s enforcement need
nor indulges every defendant’s objection. It asks a disciplined question: does
the trap purchase reflect a genuine commercial reality within the forum, or
merely the plaintiff’s choice to litigate there? Where the former, jurisdiction
follows; where the latter, it does not. This focus on commercial substance over
procedural contrivance is the doctrine’s enduring contribution, and it is why SML
is likely to be cited well beyond the agrochemical dispute that produced it.
Residual Tension
A degree of indeterminacy
remains. The line between an “isolated” trap and evidence of “commercial‑scale”
dealing is one of degree, and judges may draw it differently on similar facts.
A defendant genuinely selling into a forum through informal channels may escape
jurisdiction if only a handful of transactions can be captured; conversely, an
aggressive plaintiff may sometimes assemble enough traps to cross the threshold
in weak cases. The doctrine mitigates but does not eliminate this uncertainty.
That is perhaps inevitable: jurisdictional rules must be workable at the
threshold of a case, before the full evidentiary picture emerges, and some
imprecision is the price of early gatekeeping.
Conclusion
SML Ltd. v. M/s Happy Agro
Chemicals crystallises a doctrine Indian courts have been shaping since Banyan
Tree: trap purchases are valid evidence of infringement, but they cannot be
used to manufacture jurisdiction. A plaintiff who wishes to sue in a chosen
forum must show that the defendant’s goods are genuinely sold there at a
commercial scale, through the defendant’s own authorised channels — not merely
that an investigator managed to collect a few invoices, and certainly not that
a product is passively listed on a website accessible everywhere.
By insisting on commercial
substance over procedural contrivance, the decision aligns Indian law with
three comparative traditions:
- The English focus on fairness in trap‑order cases.
- The American principle that jurisdiction must rest
on the defendant’s own contacts, not the plaintiff’s contrivance.
- The EU’s rule that jurisdiction requires directed
activity, not mere accessibility.
The result is a workable
equilibrium. Rights‑holders retain trap purchases as a powerful investigative
tool. Defendants are protected against being dragged into distant, artificially
chosen forums. Courts gain a clear threshold test that can be applied early,
even at the interim‑injunction stage.
In short, trap purchases remain a
vital evidentiary tool — but they are no longer a skeleton key unlocking any
forum the plaintiff prefers.
This article is intended for
scholarly and educational purposes and reflects the law as discussed in the
cited decisions. It is not legal advice. Case citations should be verified
against the official reports before being relied upon in practice; certain 2026
High Court decisions cited here are recent and their neutral or report
citations may still be settling.
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